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STUDENT ASSISTANTS AND THE NLRB:
A CALL FOR NOTICE-AND-COMMENT RULEMAKING
Andrew F. Boccio*
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 23, 2016, student assistants1 seeking to form unions
throughout the country scored a major victory when the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB or Board) issued its decision in Columbia
University.2 In a 3–1 decision, the Board reversed a twelve-year-old
precedent and held that virtually all graduate and undergraduate students
employed by private educational institutions are statutory employees under
the National Labor Relations Act3 (NLRA or Act).4 Columbia University
marks the latest development in a decades-long struggle that has included
contentious stand-offs between universities and students looking to
unionize,5 a united front of Ivy-League schools against unionization,6 and
numerous policy reversals by the NLRB.7
Prior to Columbia University, student employees were excluded from
the protections of the NLRA under the Board’s 2004 decision in Brown
University.8 That ruling held that the Act extended only to employees whose
primary relationship with their employer is “fundamentally economic,”9 and
*J.D. Candidate, 2018, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Ramapo College of New
Jersey. I would like to thank Professor Timothy P. Glynn for his thoughtful guidance and
suggestions, as well as the staff of the Seton Hall Law Review for its editing assistance.
1
Throughout this Comment, the term “student assistants” is used to refer to all graduate
and undergraduate students who are employed by the educational institution at which they are
enrolled.
2
Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016).
3
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012).
4
Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *2.
5
See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden, “The University Works Because We Do”: Collective
Bargaining Rights for Graduate Assistants, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233, 1238–42 (2001)
(discussing student unionization efforts at Yale University and Kansas University).
6
Brief of Amici Curiae Brown University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College,
Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Pennsylvania,
Princeton University, Stanford University, Yale University at 1–3, Columbia Univ., 362
N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016) (No. 02-RC-143012).
7
See infra Part IV.
8
Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 493 (2004).
9
Id. at 488 (citing WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1275 (1999)).
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not to workers who are “primarily students.”10 In Columbia University, the
Board eliminated this “primary-purpose” test11 and held that the Act protects
any student in a common-law employment relationship with his or her
school.12
At its most basic level, the debate over the employment status of
students under the NLRA reflects a fundamental disagreement about the role
of both students and universities. Opponents of student unionization contend
that collective bargaining threatens to undermine the primary functions of
universities—fostering the free flow of ideas13 and allowing students to earn
degrees as quickly and efficiently as possible.14 On the other hand,
proponents of unionization argue that these concerns are wholly overblown
and no compelling reason justifies treating students differently than any
other employees.15 At the center of this disagreement is the NLRB itself.
The Board, comprised of five presidential appointees,16 has gained notoriety
for frequently shifting its policies when a new political party takes control of
the executive branch.17 Exacerbating this political reality, the Board
develops the vast majority of its policies through case-law and
adjudication,18 which is more susceptible to reversal than the more formal
“notice-and-comment” rulemaking favored by most other administrative
agencies.19
This Comment will discuss student unions, the NLRB, and the
interaction between them to provide background and explain why a
definitive answer on the employment status of student assistants has been so
elusive. It will then attempt to identify a path moving forward to ensure the
continued protection of student assistants while making the necessary
accommodations to address the unique position of universities in American
society. Part II will introduce the role of student assistants and give a brief
10

Id. at 493.
Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *5 (Aug. 23, 2016).
12
Id. at *2. As articulated by the Board, a common-law employment relationship “exists
when a servant performs services for another, under the other’s control or right of control, and
in return for payment.” Id. at *3.
13
Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 490.
14
Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *23 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting) (“If
one regards college as a competition, this is one area where ‘winning isn’t everything, it is the
only thing,’ and I believe winning in this context means fulfilling degree requirements,
hopefully on time.”) (internal citation omitted).
15
Id. at *8–13 (majority opinion).
16
29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012).
17
ROBERT GORMAN, MATTHEW W. FINKIN, & TIMOTHY GLYNN, COX AND BOK’S LABOR
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 87–88 (16th ed. 2016).
18
N.L.R.B. v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 832 F.3d 432, 445 n.13 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)).
19
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Potential of Rulemaking by the NLRB, 5 FIU L. REV. 411, 416
(2010).
11
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overview of the history and rationales behind their fight to unionize. Part III
will introduce the NLRA and the Board designed to administer it, focusing
on the Board’s structure, authority, and politically-charged nature. Part IV
will discuss the history of NLRB jurisprudence concerning the employment
status of student assistants, which culminated in Columbia University. Part
V will call for the NLRB to exercise its notice-and-comment rulemaking
authority to codify Columbia University and address some of the concerns
unique to the student-employment context.
II. GRADUATE ASSISTANTS AND THEIR FIGHT FOR UNIONIZATION
After Columbia University, both undergraduate and graduate assistants
have the right to form unions and collectively bargain with their
universities;20 however, the historical push for student-unionization has been
led by, and primarily focused on, graduate students. At educational
institutions across the United States, graduate students perform various
teaching and research-related services for their universities in exchange for
compensation.21 Increasingly, universities rely on these students to perform
critical functions.22 This Part introduces the role of graduate assistants and
provides a brief historical overview of their unionization efforts.
A. The Role of Graduate Assistants
A graduate assistant is any graduate student who works for his or her
university while simultaneously juggling the academic workload necessary
to pursue an advanced degree.23 In return for their services, graduate
assistants typically receive compensation through a stipend, tuition
reimbursement, or other form of payment.24 These assistants can be
classified into three categories: (1) teaching assistants, (2) research
assistants,25 and (3) all other graduate assistants.

20

Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *2.
See generally Hayden, supra note 5, at 1250–51.
22
Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 498 (2004) (Members Liebman and Walsh,
dissenting).
23
See Neal H. Hutchens & Melissa B. Hutchens, Catching the Union Bug: Graduate
Student Employees and Unionization, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 105, 106 (2004); Hayden, supra note
5, at 1236.
24
Sheldon D. Pollack & Daniel V. Johns, Graduate Students, Unions, and Brown
University, 20 LAB. LAW. 243, 246 (2004).
25
Research assistants are distinct from research associates. Research associates perform
work for a university after receiving their doctorates, and they are considered statutory
employees with the right to unionize. C.W. Post Ctr., 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 906–07 (1971); see
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621, 623 (1974).
21
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The typical responsibilities of a teaching assistant include teaching
certain undergraduate classes and helping professors handle larger lecture
classes.26 Teaching assistants may also be asked to “select textbooks, plan
syllabi, design tests, plan lectures, plan laboratory setup, compose final
exams, and grade all tests and projects.”27 Research assistants perform field
and laboratory research,28 either to assist a professor or independently.29
Funding for this research may come either from the school or from outside
sources in the form of grants.30 The final category of graduate assistants is
comprised of any student-employee who does not fall neatly into either of
the above two categories, such as office assistants in administrative
departments, and curatorial assistants in university museums.31 Depending
on the university and the nature of the tasks performed, the work of these
graduate assistants may or may not be a required component of earning an
advanced degree.32
From a university’s perspective, graduate students earn significantly
less than full-time faculty, and schools have increasingly turned to them as
“an attractive cost-saving measure.”33 This dependence on graduate
assistants has “created a group of workers who demand more economic
benefits and workplace rights.”34 The time to complete a degree has
increased, and some students “perceive the faculty with whom they work
with to be living in comparative luxury.”35 For nearly fifty years, graduate
students have sought to address some of these concerns through the
mechanisms of unionization and collective bargaining.
26

Hayden, supra note 5, at 1236.
Id. at 1236 n.12.
28
Id. at 1236.
29
See Leland Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 622 (discussing how Ph.D. candidates must
complete research projects assigned by the University before performing the independent
research required for a doctorate).
30
N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1215 (2000). Before Columbia University, this
distinction was a relevant factor in determining whether certain assistants were statutory
employees. Id.
31
Hayden, supra note 5, at 1236 n.11.
32
Compare N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1207 (“[I]t is undisputed that working as a
graduate assistant is not a requirement for obtaining a graduate degree in most departments.”)
with Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 484 (2004) (“[M]ost university departments at Brown
require a student to serve as a TA or RA to obtain a degree.”). Opponents of student unions
argue that a student who performs work that would have to be completed anyway to obtain a
degree cannot simultaneously be considered an employee for that same work. See Leland
Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 622–23.
33
Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 498 (Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting).
34
Id. (citing Gordon J. Hewitt, Graduate Student Employee Collective Bargaining and
the Educational Relationship between Faculty and Graduate Students, 29 J. COLLECTIVE
NEGOT. PUB. SECTOR 153, 154 (2000)).
35
Id. (quoting Daniel J. Julius & Patricia J. Gumport, Graduate Student Unionization:
Catalysts and Consequences, 26 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 187, 191, 196 (2002)).
27
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B. A Brief History of Graduate-Student Unions
The history of graduate-student unions dates back to the late 1960s,
when the University of Wisconsin-Madison voluntarily recognized a union
of teaching assistants and entered into a collectively-bargained employment
contract.36 Since then, graduate students at numerous public universities
have followed suit and established unions of their own. At the time of the
Columbia University decision, more than 64,000 students in at least twentyeight colleges had organized.37
In sharp contrast to the relative success achieved by unions at these
public universities, students at private universities, until very recently, have
almost universally been excluded from collective bargaining.38 This
dichotomy can be blamed on the disparate legal standards governing each
group of students. At public universities, the labor laws of a particular state
govern the right to organize.39 State legislatures may freely grant students at
public universities the right to unionize, and many have so chosen.40 On the
other hand, the uniform standard of the NLRA governs essentially all private
universities in the United States.41 As set forth in detail below, the NLRB
has historically refused to grant graduate assistants the right to unionize,42
which meant that a proposed student union at a private university could gain
recognition only in the unlikely event that a university voluntarily chose to
accept it.43 Given the vigor with which these schools have opposed student
36
EDMUND DAVID CRONON & JOHN W. JENKINS, 4 THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN: A
HISTORY 495–96 (1999), http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/UW/UW-idx?type=article&
did=UW.UWHist19451971v4.i0019&id=UW.UWHist19451971v4&. In addition to its
desire to improve pay and working conditions, the Wisconsin teaching assistants’ union
originated out of a wish for educational reform and anti-war activism. Id. at 494. For a
detailed look at the early days of the Wisconsin union, see id. at 494–506.
37
Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *9 (Aug. 23, 2016) (citing J. Berry
& M. Savarese, Directory of U.S. Faculty Contracts and Bargaining Agents in Institutions of
Higher Education (2012)).
38
See Robert A. Epstein, Note, Breaking Down the Ivory Tower Sweatshops: Graduate
Student Assistants and Their Elusive Search for Employee Status on the Private University
Campus, 20 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 157, 163 (2006).
39
See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012) (“The term ‘employer’ . . . shall not include the United
States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or . . . any State or political subdivision
thereof.”). See generally Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1358, 1361–88 (1982) (discussing various doctrinal distinctions between public
and private labor law).
40
As of 2010, fourteen states had conferred this right. Josh Rinschler, Note, Students or
Employees? The Struggle over Graduate Student Unions in America’s Private Colleges and
Universities, 36 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 615, 619 n.25 (2010); see, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §
3562(e) (West 2016).
41
Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 334 (1970) (asserting jurisdiction over private
universities that have a substantial impact on interstate commerce).
42
See infra Part IV.
43
Only one university—New York University—has ever voluntarily recognized such a
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unionization, it should come as no surprise that not a single private university
voluntarily recognized a student union until 2013.44
III. THE NLRA
In the midst of the Great Depression in 1935, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt signed the NLRA into law.45 As amended by the 1947 TaftHartley Act,46 the NLRA provides important protections to employees
throughout the country.47 Congress specified the NLRA’s purpose within
the first section of the Act:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate . . . certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce . . . by encouraging . . . collective bargaining and by
protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions
of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.48
The focus on the protection of commerce was crucial to the Act’s
survival during early challenges under the Commerce Clause,49 and it
remains an important factor today in determining who receives the Act’s
protections.50
In furtherance of the above policy, the NLRA confers upon employees
“the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representation of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining.”51 The Act also prohibits employers and labor organizations
from engaging in certain “unfair labor practices” that would interfere with
union. Press Release, New York University, Joint Statement of NYU and GSOC and SET,
UAW (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.nyu.edu/about/news-publications/news/2013/november/
joint-statement-of-nyu-and-gsoc-and-set-uaw.html. As part of its agreement with NYU, the
union agreed to withdraw a pending petition before the NLRB. Id.
44
Id.
45
Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board Revisited,
14 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L. J. 24, 27 (2014) (footnotes omitted).
46
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012).
47
Id.
48
Id. § 151.
49
See N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1937).
50
See § 160(a) (“The Board is empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in
any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce.”) (emphasis added). As discussed in greater
detail below, opponents of student unionization cite the NLRA’s principal objective of
facilitating the free flow of commerce to justify excluding students from coverage under the
Act. See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 496 (2004) (citing WBAI Pacifica Found., 328
N.L.R.B. 1273, 1275 (1999)) (“The vision of a fundamentally economic relationship between
employers and employees is inescapable.”).
51
§ 157.
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these rights.52
A. The Structure and Function of the NLRB
Rather than leaving the administration of the NLRA to the courts,
Congress created an administrative agency—the NLRB.53 The Board is
headed by a five-member panel appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate.54 The five members each serve staggered fiveyear terms,55 with the term of one member expiring each year.56 Once
appointed and confirmed, Board members may only be removed by the
President after a hearing “for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.”57
Although the Act does not mandate bi-partisanship, tradition dating back to
the Eisenhower administration dictates that the Board be comprised of three
members from the President’s party and two from the opposing party.58 In
addition to the five-member panel, the Board maintains Regional Offices
throughout the county, each of which falls under the supervision of a
Regional Director.59
The NLRB has two primary functions: to prevent unfair labor
practices60 and to hold and regulate representation elections.61 Under the
Administrative Procedures Act,62 the Board has two rulemaking tools it can
employ to accomplish these goals:63 the promulgation of administrative
regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations (“notice-and-comment
rulemaking”)64 and adjudication through quasi-judicial proceedings.65
52
See generally Gerilynn Falasco & William J. Jackson, The Graduate Assistant Labor
Movement, NYU and its Aftermath: A Study of the Attitudes of Graduate Teaching and
Research Assistants at Seven Universities, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 753, 756–57 (2004).
53
§ 153(a). For an overview of the rationale behind the decision to create the Board, see
Daniel P. O’Gorman, Construing the National Labor Relations Act: The NLRB and Methods
of Statutory Construction, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 177, 182–83 (2008).
54
§ 153(a).
55
Id.
56
Id. (“[A]ny individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the
unexpired term of the member whom he shall succeed.”); O’Gorman, supra note 53, at 187.
57
§ 153(a).
58
William B. Gould IV, Politics and the Effect on the National Labor Relations Board’s
Adjudicative and Rulemaking Processes, 64 EMORY L.J. 1501, 1507–08 (2015); see Members
of the NLRB since 1935, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/whowe-are/board/members-nlrb-1935 (last visited Sept. 8, 2017).
59
GORMAN, supra note 17, at 74.
60
29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2012).
61
§ 159(c); see O’Gorman, supra note 53, at 181.
62
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2012).
63
29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012) (“The Board shall have authority . . . to make, amend, and
rescind, in the manner prescribed by [the Administrative Procedure Act], such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.”).
64
5 U.S.C. § 553.
65
Id. § 554.
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Creating an administrative regulation through notice-and-comment
rulemaking entails a three-step process. First, an agency must publish notice
of the proposed rule in the Federal Register.66 Second, interested persons
must have the opportunity to make comments and argue for or against the
proposed rule.67 Finally, the agency must provide a “concise general
statement” of the basis and purpose behind the rule.68
Despite its administrative rulemaking powers, the Board has almost
exclusively chosen to resolve disputes and develop precedent through
adjudication.69 The major cases discussed in this Comment came before the
Board via a specific type of proceeding that falls under the Board’s authority
to regulate elections. First, a group of workers who desire representation (in
this case students) petition the Regional Office to request a representation
election.70 The Regional Office will then determine: (1) whether the
petitioners fall within the scope of the NLRA;71 and (2) if so, whether the
petitioners constitute “an appropriate unit for collective bargaining.”72 A
determination by a Regional Director may be appealed to the five-member
Board for review on specified grounds.73 Through this mechanism, the
Board has repeatedly found itself questioning the employment status of
student-employees.74

66

Id. § 553(b). The notice must include “(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature
of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is
proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved.” Id.
67
§ 553(c).
68
Id.
69
N.L.R.B. v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 832 F.3d 432, 445 n.13 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)). See generally
Charlotte Garden, Toward Politically Stable NLRB Lawmaking: Rulemaking vs. Adjudication,
64 EMORY L.J. 1469, 1471 (2015). See infra Part V.A. for a discussion of the pros and cons
of this approach by the Board. Part V will argue that the Board should exercise its rulemaking
authority to define and protect the rights of student-employees.
70
O’Gorman, supra note 53, at 81.
71
See, e.g., N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1220 (2000).
72
Id. at 1221.
73
29 C.F.R. § 102.67(c). The Board will only grant review where (1) “A substantial
question of law or policy is raised;” (2) “the regional director’s decision on a substantial
factual issue is clearly [and prejudicially] erroneous;” (3) “the conduct of any hearing or any
ruling made in connection with the proceeding has resulted in prejudicial error” or (4) “there
are compelling reasons for reconsideration of an important Board rule or policy.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.67(d).
74
See infra Part IV.

BOCCIO (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

10/31/2017 11:33 AM

COMMENT

201

B. Jurisdictional Limits of the NLRB
Before the NLRB may hear a case, it must grapple with constitutional
and self-imposed limits on its jurisdiction. Congress vested the NLRB with
“the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the
Commerce Clause.”75 Therefore, the Board has authority over any business
that engages in or substantially affects interstate commerce.76
Even if this constitutional test is satisfied, the NLRB has the discretion
to decline jurisdiction when hearing a case would not effectuate the policies
of the Act, or would not be an appropriate use of the Board’s limited
resources.77 An excellent example occurred recently in the university
context. In Northwestern University, the Board declined to assert
jurisdiction over scholarship football players seeking to unionize, reasoning
that a ruling that addressed only the employment status of athletes at private
institutions would not promote the stability of labor relations in an “industry”
dominated by public universities.78
C. The Shifting Ideologies of the NLRB
Throughout its history, and particularly during the last few decades, the
NLRB has garnered a somewhat infamous reputation for being highly
politicized.79 Frequent turnover in the Board’s composition through the
appointment procedure discussed above80 leads to frequent reversals in
decisions regarding controversial topics.81 This is because the Board is not
75
N.L.R.B. v. Le Fort Enters., Inc., 791 F.3d 207, 209 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing N.L.R.B.
v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963)).
76
R.W. Harmon & Sons, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 664 F.2d 248, 250 (10th Cir. 1981), overruled
on other grounds by Aramark Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 179 F.3d 872 (10th Cir. 1999).
77
29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (2012) (“The Board, in its discretion, may . . . decline to assert
jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where . . .
the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the
exercise of its jurisdiction.”); see, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Somerville Const. Co., 206 F.3d 752, 755
n.3 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting the Board asserts jurisdiction over a non-retail business only if its
gross outflow or inflow across state lines exceeds $50,000); N.L.R.B. v. Dredge Operators,
Inc., 19 F.3d 206, 212 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Offshore Express Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 378
(1983)) (discussing the Board’s refusal of jurisdiction over a United States Navy vessel
operating on a remote island in the Indian Ocean). In addition to these standards developed
through adjudication, the Board has occasionally exercised its notice-and-comment
rulemaking authority to codify jurisdictional standards for specific industries. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 103.1 (colleges); 29 C.F.R. § 103.2 (symphony orchestras); 29 C.F.R. § 103.3 (“horseracing
and dogracing”).
78
Nw. Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 167, at *3 (Aug. 17, 2015).
79
GORMAN, supra note 17, at 87–88. For a detailed analysis on the wisdom of the
Board’s structure and operating procedure, see Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud,
The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and
Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2077–84 (2009).
80
See discussion supra p. 200.
81
Rinschler, supra note 40, at 618–19. For a continuously updated list of Board
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bound by the doctrine of stare decisis and can disregard its precedents
whenever it has “adequately explicated the basis of its [new]
interpretation.”82 As a Canadian commentator astutely noted: “In the United
States where, because of legislative paralysis, there has been no major labour
law reform for 50 years, the government in power influences the direction of
labour relations policy through its appointments.”83
While this trend has prevailed for decades, it does not date back to the
Act’s inception. Congress initially envisioned the Board as a nonpartisan
body.84 In the early years of the Board, Democratic Presidents Roosevelt
and Truman appointed Board members almost exclusively from government
service or academia.85 This policy changed when President Eisenhower, the
first Republican president since the New Deal, appointed managementfriendly members to the Board.86 After the Board completed its
transformation following Eisenhower’s third appointment, it reversed
several prevailing Board precedents.87 Since Eisenhower, the Board has
frequently overruled decisions put into place by the prior administration.88
The effects of the Board’s politicization are exacerbated by the
deferential standard federal courts accord to the Board’s interpretation of the
NLRA.89 With specific regard to the Act’s statutory definition of
“employee,” the Supreme Court has indicated that it will uphold any
interpretation that is “reasonably defensible.”90 Although the Supreme Court
has not yet had the occasion to address the employment status of studentcompositions dating back to the NLRA’s inception, see Members of the NLRB since 1935,
N.L.R.B., https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/members-nlrb-1935 (last visited Sept. 8,
2017).
82
Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v.
N.L.R.B., 802 F.2d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S.
251, 267 (1975)).
83
Kevin Burkett, The Politicization of Ontario Labour Relations, 6 CANADIAN LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 161, 173 (1998). Burkett’s observation rings particularly true in the university
context, where the NLRB has repeatedly shifted its policy. See infra Part IV.
84
Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB,
1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1363 (2000) (internal citation omitted).
85
Id. at 1365–66.
86
Id. at 1368–69.
87
B. Glenn George, To Bargain or Not to Bargain: A New Chapter in Work Relocation
Decisions, 69 MINN. L. REV. 667, 668 n.14 (1985). For a contemporary view on the policyshift by the Eisenhower Board, see Directors of the Columbia Law Review Association, Inc.,
The NLRB Under Republican Administration: Recent Trends and Their Political
Implications, 55 COLUM L. REV. 852 (1955).
88
See, e.g., Harold J. Datz, When One Board Reverses Another: A Chief Counsel’s
Perspective, 1 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 71–80 (2011).
89
See generally Michael C. Harper, Judicial Control of the National Labor Relations
Board’s Lawmaking in the Age of Chevron and Brand X, 89 B.U. L. REV. 189, 191–94 (2009).
90
Holly Farms Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 517 U.S. 392, 409 (1996) (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984).
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employees, based on the controversial nature of the topic, it likely would
uphold the decision of the Board.
IV. THE NLRB’S EVER-CHANGING STANCE TOWARDS STUDENTEMPLOYEES
The NLRB’s journey to Columbia University has been far from smooth.
Since the early 1950s, the Board has struggled with questions of whether to
extend the protections of the NLRA to educational institutions and, if so,
whether those protections apply to students in addition to faculty.91 The
Board’s jurisprudence in this area has been riddled with decisions that
reverse some precedents, narrow others into near-oblivion, and generally
leave both students and universities wondering what will happen when a new
president takes office. This Part begins with an overview of the general
analytical framework used by the Board in making its employeeclassification decisions, followed by the history and development of NLRB
employment classification in the academic context through a case-by-case
analysis.
A. Analytical Framework
Though the precise framework utilized in each decision has varied, the
cases discussed below have more or less employed a two-prong test to
determine whether to classify students as employees under the NLRA. First,
the Board has looked to the plain meaning of the words “employee” and
“employer,” as defined by section 2 of the Act, to determine whether students
and the universities they work for satisfy those definitions.92 Second, even
if it determined that the petitioning students fell within the literal meaning of
the statute, the Board has looked to the policies underlying the Act to
determine whether the students should nonetheless be excluded.93
1. Statutory Definitions
Section 2 of the NLRA defines both “employee” and “employer,” but
does not affirmatively describe either term.94 Instead, each definition

91

See infra pp. 207-18.
Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *4–6 (Aug. 23, 2016).
93
Id. at *6–13.
94
29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). Section 2(3) unhelpfully defines “employee” as “any
employee.” § 152(3).
92
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contains a list of persons who are not employers95 or employees.96 The
Supreme Court has recognized that when Congress uses the term
“employee” without defining it, it reflects the common law agency doctrine
of the conventional master-servant relationship.97 Therefore, since section 2
excludes neither students nor universities, the debate over this prong turns
on whether students and universities have a common-law employment
relationship under the law of agency.98
As typically defined in the labor-law context, a common-law
employment relationship exists when a servant performs services (1) for the
benefit of another, (2) under the other’s control or right of control, and (3) in
return for payment.99 Two specific issues typically arise in the university
context: whether a student performs work for the benefit of the university, or
for his own benefit;100 and whether a student who performs services does so
in return for compensation, or merely receives compensation independently
of any work actually performed.101
2. Policy Considerations
Even if the employee and employer fall under the literal meaning of the
statute, the Board may nonetheless exclude certain parties from the NLRA if
it would not further the Act’s policies to extend them coverage.102 For
95
As noted above, the NLRA extends coverage only to employees of private employers.
See § 152(2). The section 2(2) definition of “employer” further excludes “[(1)] any person
subject to the Railway Labor Act, . . . [(2)] any labor organization (other than when acting as
an employer), [and (3)] anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor
organization.” Id.
96
The section 2(3) definition of “employee” excludes (1) agricultural laborers, (2)
workers “in the domestic service of any family or person at his home,” (3) persons employed
by a parent or spouse, (4) independent contractors, (5) supervisors, (6) “any individual
employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act,” and (7) anyone employed by a
person who is not an “employer” under section 152(2). § 152(3).
97
See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 320 (1992) (ERISA); Cmty.
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989) (Copyright Act of 1976).
98
Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *15–18 (Aug. 23, 2016).
99
N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90–91, 93–95 (1995).
100
See Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621, 623 (1974) (finding research
assistants perform work “to advance their own academic standing”).
101
See id. at 621 (“[P]ayments to the R[esearch] A[ssistants] are in the nature of stipends
or grants to permit them to pursue their advanced degrees and are not based on the skill or
function of the particular individual or the nature of the research performed.”).
102
See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 488, 491 (2004) (“[A]ssuming arguendo that
[graduate-assistants are common-law employees], it does not follow that they are employees
within the meaning of the Act. The issue of employee status under the Act turns on whether
Congress intended to cover the individual in question.”). The need for this second piece of
the analysis stems from the canon of statutory construction stating that a regulatory statute
should not be read in isolation, but as part of the entire regulatory scheme. FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000). This second prong can also be
justified based on the Board’s express authority to decline jurisdiction when a particular labor
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instance, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., the Supreme Court held that
“managerial employees” fall outside the Act’s protection because they are
“so clearly outside the [NLRA] that no specific exclusionary provision was
thought necessary.”103 The Court reasoned that holding otherwise would
“eviscerate the traditional distinction between labor and management.”104
For a less extreme example, the Board in Goodwill Industries of Tidewater
excluded clients of a non-profit organization that provided training to
handicapped individuals in order to help them enter the workforce.105 The
non-profit entered into a contract with a local naval base whereby its
handicapped clients provided janitorial services for the base.106 Although
the local naval base paid the clients wages and the clients worked alongside
non-handicapped employees of the non-profit, the Board nonetheless
excluded them from the Act because they had a “primarily rehabilitative”
relationship with their employer and worked under conditions not typical of
the private sector.107
B. 1951-1970: The Board Asserts Jurisdiction over Private
Universities
Throughout the first few decades after the enactment of the NLRA, it
was unclear whether the Act’s protections would extend to academic
institutions at all, much less to students. Congress had originally exempted
non-profit hospitals from the Act,108 but made no such exclusion for
universities, leaving the issue open. In the two cases that follow, the Board
juggled the threshold questions of whether universities fell within its
jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause and, if so, whether the Act’s
policies justified classifying universities as statutory employers.
1. Columbia University (1951)
The Board first addressed the application of the NLRA to the academic
setting in Columbia University (1951),109 when it heard a petition filed on
dispute does not affect commerce sufficiently to justify the use of the Board’s resources. 29
U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (2012); see supra pp. 10–11.
103
N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 283 (1974).
104
Id.; see also N.L.R.B. v. Hendricks Cty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170,
179 (1981) (quoting Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946)) (upholding exclusion
of “employees who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who exercise
‘managerial’ functions in the field of labor relations.”).
105
Goodwill Indus. of Tidewater, Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 767, 767 (1991).
106
Id.
107
Id. at 767–78.
108
Trs. of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 424 (1951). Congress subsequently
amended section 2(2) to eliminate this exclusion. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360,
88 Stat. 395.
109
This designation distinguishes the 1951 case from the 2016 Columbia University
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behalf of clerical employees working in the libraries of Columbia
University.110 The Board first found that the University “affect[ed]
commerce sufficiently” to fall within its Commerce Clause jurisdiction.111
However, the Board held that it would not further the policies of the Act to
assert jurisdiction over a “nonprofit, educational institution where the
activities involved are noncommercial in nature and intimately connected the
charitable purposes and educational activities of the institution.”112 A key
component of the Board’s reasoning was that since Congress had expressly
excluded non-profit hospitals from the NLRA, it therefore likely would not
have wanted to extend coverage to non-profit colleges.113
2. Cornell University (1970)
Nearly twenty years after Columbia University (1951), the Board
reversed course in Cornell University, which involved faculty at Cornell and
Syracuse Universities.114 The Board began by noting that since the section
2(2) definition of “employer” does not specifically exclude them, non-profit
colleges clearly fall within the plain meaning of the statute.115 Moving to
policy concerns, the Board rejected the notion that the congressional
exclusion of non-profit hospitals somehow inferred an intent to deny
coverage to university employees.116 Next, after reviewing evidence
showing that universities “have not only a substantial, but massive, impact
on interstate commerce,” the Board overturned Columbia University (1951)
and asserted jurisdiction over “nonprofit, private educational institutions
whose operations have a substantial effect on [interstate] commerce.”117
C. 1972-1999: The Board Kicks Graduate Assistants to the Curb
Since Cornell University, the Board has continuously exercised
jurisdiction over faculty at private colleges. With that issue firmly decided,
the Board’s attention turned to whether students should be extended the
Act’s protections as well. Two years after Cornell University, the Board
decided Adelphi University, which concerned a petition by a bargaining unit
decision that granted students the ability to unionize. See infra pp. 212–14.
110
Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424.
111
Id. at 425.
112
Id. at 427.
113
Id.
114
Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
115
Id. at 329.
116
Id. at 331–32.
117
Id. at 332, 334. The Board subsequently refined this test and, in a rare exercise of its
notice-and-comment rulemaking authority, determined that it would assert jurisdiction only
over colleges or universities that generated at least $1 million in gross annual profits. 29
C.F.R. § 103.1 (2016).
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consisting of both a university’s regular faculty and graduate assistants.118
The Adelphi University Board excluded the graduate assistants from the unit,
reasoning that the students did not “share a sufficient community of interest”
with the faculty because they were “primarily students.”119 Although
Adelphi University did not address the assistants’ statutory employment
status, subsequent Board decisions would latch onto this “primary students”
language as a rationale for denying coverage to student assistants
altogether.120
1. Leland Stanford Junior University (1974)
The Board finally directly addressed the employment status of certain
graduate assistants in Leland Stanford Junior University.121 Leland Stanford
addressed a group of research assistants in Stanford’s physics department
who received compensation from the university in the form of stipends or
grants.122 The students in question were all Ph.D. candidates who were
obligated to perform independent research as part of their doctoral
programs.123 However, before allowing independent research, Stanford
required the candidates to perform specified research under supervision to
“prepare the student for selection of a topic for a dissertation” and “to
determine the student’s interest and ability.”124
Based on the above facts, the Board dismissed an election petition filed
on behalf the students because it did not consider the research assistants to
be “employees” within the meaning of section 2(3) of the NLRA.125 This
conclusion, however, came as somewhat of an afterthought towards the end
of the Board’s opinion.126 The crux of the Board’s reasoning can be properly
thought of in terms of the two-pronged common-law/policy framework
outlined above.127 Regarding the common-law definition of employee,128 the
Board reasoned that (1) the assistants performed research “to advance their
own academic standing,” and thus not for the benefit of the employer;129 and
118

Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972).
Id. at 640.
120
See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 487 (2004); St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229
N.L.R.B. 1000, 1001 (1977).
121
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621 (1974).
122
Id. at 621.
123
Id. at 621–22.
124
Id. at 622.
125
Id. at 623.
126
Id.
127
See discussion supra, pp. 205–07.
128
A common-law employment relationship exists when a servant performs services (1)
for the benefit of another, (2) under the other’s control or right of control, and (3) in return for
payment. N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90–91, 93–95 (1995).
129
Leland Stanford, 214 N.L.R.B. at 623.
119
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(2) the University dispersed stipends to help the students pursue a degree,
and thus, not in return for services.130 As for policy concerns, the Board
noted that the assistants and Stanford did not have a traditional employment
relationship because, while an employee may be fired for unsatisfactory
performance, a research assistant would merely receive a failing grade.131
Based on these findings, and building off Adelphi University, the Board held
the assistants to be “primarily students” and thus, not employees.132
2. The Teaching Hospital Cases (1976-1999)
In the years that followed Leland Stanford, the Board refined what
became known as the “primary-purpose” test in a different, but related,
setting—teaching hospitals. In two similar decisions in the late 1970s, the
Board dismissed petitions seeking representation elections for bargaining
units consisting of interns and residents who worked at certain hospitals.133
Like graduate assistants, these hospital workers performed services and
received compensation, but unlike graduate assistants, they already had their
degrees and were working to fulfill licensing requirements to practice
medicine.134 Nevertheless, the Board held that since the primary purpose of
the residents’ work was educational, the residents should be excluded from
the Act.135 Unlike the common-law-centric approach taken in Leland
Stanford, the Board relied almost exclusively on policy considerations to
make its determinations. In particular, the Board in St. Clare’s Hospital
expressed concerns that collective bargaining would infringe on academic
freedom and hinder the interns’ ability to receive an effective education.136
This status quo persisted until 1999, when a Board composed of
President Clinton’s appointees137 decided Boston Medical Center and
reassessed the employment status of medical residents and interns.138 In a
3–2 decision, the Board reversed both St. Clare’s Hospital and Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center and held that interns, residents, and fellows employed by a
130

Id. at 622.
Id. at 623.
132
Id.
133
St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr.,
223 N.L.R.B. 251, 253 (1976).
134
Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 253.
135
St. Clare’s, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1002; Cedars-Sinai, 223 N.L.R.B. at 253.
136
St. Clare’s, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1003.
137
Like previous Boards, the Clinton NLRB had no issue overturning precedents put into
place by previous administrations. See, e.g., Springs Indus., Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 40 (2000)
(overturning Kokomo Tube Co., 280 N.L.R.B. 357 (1986) and finding that the Board should
presume that an unlawful threat of plant closing disseminated to one worker was also
disseminated to additional workers). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Springs Industries was itself
overruled by the Bush Board in Crown Bolt, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 776 (2004).
138
Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999).
131
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teaching hospital are statutory employees under the Act.139 The majority
reasoned that the educational benefits received by the hospital workers did
not have any bearing on employment status.140 This rationale became crucial
in the student-assistant cases that followed.
D. 2000-Present: NLRB Indecisiveness
With the Board’s decision in Boston Medical Center, commentators
began to speculate whether the Clinton Board would reverse course from
Leland Stanford and extend the Act’s protections to graduate assistants as
well.141 Shortly thereafter, the Clinton Board answered when it granted
statutory employment status to certain graduate assistants for the first time.
1. New York University (2000)
In New York University, the NLRB heard a petition by a union seeking
to represent teaching and research assistants at New York University
(NYU).142 Turning first to the statutory definition of employee, the Board
found that graduate assistants fall within the plain meaning of “any
employee” under section 2(3) of the NLRA and the common law.143 In doing
so, the Board explicitly rejected several arguments, including some that the
Leland Stanford Board had found persuasive.144 First, the University argued
that graduate assistants spent only about fifteen percent of their time
performing duties for the University.145 The Board rejected this argument
and analogized the graduate assistants to part-time employees, who had been
previously adjudicated to be statutory employees.146 Next, NYU claimed
that graduate assistants receive “financial aid” and not “compensation,” and
may receive the same funding even if they perform no work.147 To this, the
Board responded:
[T]he graduate assistants, unlike the students receiving financial
aid, perform work . . . for the Employer under terms and
conditions controlled by the Employer. That this is work in
139

Id. at 152. Unlike the graduate-assistant cases, Boston Medical Center has never been
overturned. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B No. 90, at *3 (Aug. 23, 2016).
140
See Boston Med., 330 N.L.R.B. at 160 (“[W]hatever other description may be fairly
applied to house staff, it does not preclude a finding that individuals in such positions are,
among other things, employees as defined by the Act.”).
141
See, e.g., Bernhard Wolfgang Rohrbacher, Comment, After Boston Medical Center:
Why Teaching Assistants Should Have the Right to Bargain Collectively, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1849 (2000).
142
N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1205 (2000).
143
Id.
144
Id. at 1205–07.
145
Id. at 1206.
146
Id. (citing Univ. of S.F., 265 N.L.R.B. 1221 (1982)).
147
Id. at 1206–07.
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exchange for pay, and not solely the pursuit of education, is
highlighted by the absence of any academic credit for virtually all
graduate assistant work. Indeed, in most cases graduate assistants
have completed their coursework and are working on their
dissertation while performing this work.148
Finally, the Board rejected the notion that the students performed their
work primarily in furtherance of a degree, noting that most degrees did not
even require working as a graduate assistant.149
Having found the petitioning students to be common-law employees,
the Board then rejected the University’s policy arguments for excluding the
graduate assistants. First, it found that the students had a “traditional
economic relationship” with the University because the assistants’
relationship with the University mirrored that of the faculty.150 Next, the
Board briefly addressed concerns that “extending collective-bargaining
rights to graduate assistants would infringe on the [University’s] academic
freedom.”151 The Board summarily dismissed this argument, reasoning that
(1) any issue of academic freedom can be resolved through collective
bargaining, and (2) the NLRA does not require employers to agree to
anything.152
Essentially, New York University was a sound rejection of the “primarypurpose test,” with the Board explicitly holding that an educational benefit
does not preclude statutory employment status.153 Based on this holding and
the reasoning above, the Board concluded that most of NYU’s teaching
assistants and research assistants were statutory employees entitled to a
representation election.154 The decision, however, excluded a class of
research assistants funded by external grants who performed no research
outside that needed to obtain a degree.155 The decision of the Regional
Director adopted by the Board reasoned that these assistants do not actually
perform a service for another in exchange for compensation, and thus cannot
be considered “employees” under the Act.156 The exclusion of research
assistants thus left Leland Stanford intact, albeit with a very narrow scope.

148

N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1207.
Id.
150
Id. at 1207–08. As noted above, university faculty indisputably fall within the NLRA.
Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 332 (1970).
151
N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 1208.
152
Id. (citing N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 45 (1937)).
153
Id. at 1207.
154
Id. at 1205, 1221.
155
Id. at 1221.
156
Id. This issue was not appealed to the Board. See id. at 1205 n.5.
149
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2. Brown University (2004)
In the wake of New York University, unionization efforts began almost
immediately at several private universities with varying degrees of
success.157 At NYU, students successfully negotiated the first collectivelybargained contract between graduate assistants and a private university in the
nation’s history.158 This victory for student employees proved to be shortlived. Only four years later, but well into the George W. Bush
administration, the Board overruled New York University.
This
determination came in an appeal from a Regional Director’s decision to grant
an election to teaching assistants, research assistants, and proctors at Brown
University.159 The Brown University Board reversed the Regional Director
and held that even if assistants are employees at common law (an issue which
it did not decide), “it does not follow that they are employees within the
meaning of the Act.”160 Instead, the Board excluded graduate assistants from
the Act based on two policy concerns unique to the university context: (1)
the “primarily educational” relationship between students and universities,
and (2) the ever-lurking threat to academic freedom.161
The Board stressed that the policies behind the Act only justified
extending protection to employees who have a “fundamentally economic”
relationship with their employer.162 Accordingly, it revived the brieflydeceased “primary-purpose” test and held that individuals who are primarily
students cannot be statutory employees under the NLRA.163 Employing this
test, the Board found that the assistants had a primarily educational
relationship with Brown, and emphasized that: students must be enrolled at
Brown to receive a teaching assistant position, research assistant position, or
proctorship;164 the money received by the teaching assistants, research
assistants, and proctors was the same received by fellows (who perform no
services), making it financial aid and not “consideration for work;”165 and
most graduate students were pursuing a Ph.D., and unlike the assistants at

157

See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Grad Students Reject Union in Yale Vote, N.Y. TIMES
(May 2, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/02/nyregion/grad-students-reject-union-inyale-vote.html.
158
Karen W. Arenson & Steven Greenhouse, N.Y.U. and Union Agree on GraduateStudent Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/30/nyregion/nyuand-union-agree-on-graduate-student-pay.html. As noted above, such contracts had been
negotiated at many public universities. See supra p. 197.
159
Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004).
160
Id. at 491.
161
Id. at 492–93.
162
Id. at 488 (citing WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1275 (1999)).
163
Id. at 493.
164
Id. at 488.
165
Brown Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. at 485, 488.
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NYU,166 most departments at Brown required teaching as a condition of
receiving a doctorate.167 The Board expressly declined to give any weight to
empirical evidence showing the changing financial and corporate structure
of universities, reasoning that this had no bearing on whether graduate
assistants are primarily students.168
Turning to academic freedom, the Board relied heavily on St. Clare’s
Hospital169 and found that extending NLRA coverage to graduate students
would infringe upon academic freedom.170 Specifically, the Board feared
that purely academic issues would be subject to collective bargaining,
including class size, time, length, and location; decisions over who, what,
and where to teach or research; standards for advancement and graduation;
and the administration of exams.171 The Board also expressed concerns that
collective bargaining would jeopardize the “intensely personal” nature of the
student-faculty relationship.172 Finally, the Board rejected evidence that
some collective-bargaining agreements have been entered into at universities
with no intrusion into the educational process, essentially reasoning that past
performances do not guarantee future outcomes.173
3. Columbia University (2016)
The building unionization movement at private universities came to a
screeching halt after the Board’s decision in Brown University. At NYU, the
University refused to negotiate a second contract after the initially bargained
agreement expired.174 This state of affairs prevailed for over a decade, until
a Board composed of President Obama’s appointees heard a petition from a
166

N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1207 (2000).
Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 488.
168
Id. at 492.
169
St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977). As noted above, St.
Clare’s Hospital was overruled by Boston Medical Center, 330 N.L.R.B. 152 (1999). The
Brown University Board distinguished Boston Medical because the hospital workers in that
case had already earned their degrees, while the graduate assistants here had not. Brown
Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487. As for the holding of Boston Medical itself, the Board cryptically
stated that “[w]e need not decide whether [that case] was correctly decided.” Id. The Bush
Board never had a chance to reassess the employment status of hospital interns and residents.
170
Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 490.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 489–90 (citing St. Clare’s Hospital, 229 N.L.R.B. at 1002)).
173
Id. at 492 (“Even if some unions have chosen not to intrude into academic
prerogatives, that does not mean that other unions would be similarly abstemious.”).
174
Karen W. Arenson, N.Y.U. Moves to Disband Graduate Students Union, N.Y. TIMES
(June 17, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/17/education/nyu-moves-to-disbandgraduate-students-union.html. Eight years later, NYU voluntarily re-recognized the graduateassistant union. See Steven Greenhouse, N.Y.U. Graduate Assistants to Join Auto Workers’
Union, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/nyregion/nyugraduate-assistants-to-join-auto-workers-union.html.
167
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union seeking to represent teaching and research assistants at Columbia
University.175 Unlike prior student-petitions before the NLRB, the proposed
Columbia University bargaining unit contained undergraduates, as well as
graduate students.176 Based on the plain meaning of the NLRA and an
analysis of the policies behind it, the Board again changed course by
reversing Brown University and extending the Act even further than it did in
New York University.177
In a 3-1 decision, Columbia University granted employment status to
all “student assistants who have a common-law employment relationship
with their university.”178 First, the Board reaffirmed the principle that all
common-law employees not specifically excluded by section 2(3) of the
NLRA fall within the plain meaning of “employee” under the Act.179 The
Board thus concluded that the Act applied to all student assistants who are
common-law employees “unless compelling statutory and policy
considerations require an exception.”180
The Board went on to find that the “special issues” posed by the
academic-employment setting do not justify a blanket exclusion of students
from the Act.181 The majority opinion unequivocally discarded the “primarypurpose test,” finding that it had no basis in either the policies or the text of
the NLRA.182 Specifically, the Board rejected Brown University’s
requirement of a “fundamentally economic” relationship.183 Rather, it held
that the only economic relationship required by the Act is “the payment of
tangible compensation.”184 Thus, “a graduate student may be both a student
and an employee; a university may be both the student’s educator and
employer.”185
Rather than completely disregarding threats to academic freedom, as
the New York University Board did,186 the Board acknowledged that
“[i]nsofar as the concept of academic freedom implicates the First
Amendment, the Board certainly must take any such infringement into
175

Trs. of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *1 (Aug. 23, 2016).
Id.
177
Id. at *2.
178
Id. at *13.
179
Id. at *4–6.
180
Id. at *6. The Board further stated, “[w]e do not hold that the Board is required to find
workers to be statutory employees whenever they are common-law employees, but only that
the Board may and should find here that student assistants are statutory employees.” Id. at
*4.
181
Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B No. 90, at *7.
182
Id. at *5.
183
Id. at *6.
184
Id.
185
Id. at *7 (emphasis in original).
186
N.Y. Univ., 332 N.L.R.B., 1205, 1208 (2000); see discussion supra Part IV.D.1.
176
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account.”187 The majority, however, held that a generic threat to academic
freedom could not justify a blanket exclusion because: (1) the Act mandates
only employers to bargain over “wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment,”188 and (2) the Board can address specific First
Amendment issues on a case by case basis.189 Based primarily on these
reasons, the Board held that the NLRA extends to all student assistants with
a common-law employment relationship with their university.190
Lastly, the Columbia University Board considered whether the
petitioning teaching and research assistants were, in fact, common-law
employees.191 As for the teaching assistants, the Board found that those
students provided important instructional work for the university in
exchange for compensation.192 The majority then held that whether or not
completion of a degree required teaching had no bearing on the employmentstatus inquiry.193 With respect to research assistants, the Board fully
overruled Leland Stanford, and departed from New York University insofar
as that decision held that externally funded research assistants were not
statutory or common-law employees.194 The Columbia University Board
concluded that the student-researchers performed work under the direction
of the University in exchange for compensation—even if that compensation
came from a source outside of the school.195 Therefore, the Board deemed
all of the petitioning students, including undergraduates, statutory employees
under the NLRA.196
187
Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *7 (citing N.L.R.B v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (holding serious First Amendment concerns precluded Board
from exercising jurisdiction over certain faculty at church-run schools)).
188
Id. at *8 (citing First Nat. Maint. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666, 674–75 (1981)).
189
Id.
190
Id. at *13.
191
Id. at *13–18. As noted above, a common-law employment relationship exists when
a servant performs services (1) for the benefit of another, (2) under the other’s control or right
of control, and (3) in return for payment. N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S.
85, 90–91, 93–95 (1995).
192
Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *15.
193
Id. at *16 (“[T]he fact that teaching may be a degree requirement in many academic
programs does not diminish the importance of having students assist in the business of
universities by providing instructional services for which undergraduate students pay
tuition.”).
194
Id.
195
Id. at *17–18. The opinion did note that “it is theoretically possible that funders may
wish to further a student’s education by effectively giving the student unconditional
scholarship aid, and allowing the student to pursue educational goals without regard to
achieving any of the funder’s own particular research goals.” Id. at *17. This presumably
would not create a common-law employment relationship with the University and would thus
not be covered under the NLRA.
196
Id. at *16, *18. The Board additionally found that (1) undergraduate, Master’s degree,
and Ph.D. students shared a sufficient community of interest to constitute an appropriate
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V. THE FUTURE OF STUDENT-UNIONIZATION: AN ARGUMENT FOR NOTICEAND-COMMENT RULEMAKING
In the months since Columbia University, students at private
universities have once again begun to organize unionization efforts. At
Columbia University, graduate students voted overwhelmingly in favor of
unionization.197 At Yale, students in eight departments voted to unionize198
following an order by the Regional Director permitting unionization on a
department-by-department basis.199 Elections have also been held at
Harvard200 and Cornell.201
These developments notwithstanding, students’ right to unionize is far
from etched in stone. The political instability of the NLRB means that a
reconstituted Board could easily reverse course again and return to the
Brown University “primary-purpose” standard. This uncertainty makes it
critical that the employment status of student assistants be decided with some
semblance of finality. The Board should act to codify its holding in
Columbia University and make clear that students in a common-law
employment relationship with their schools are statutory employees under

collective-bargaining unit; and (2) none of the students were “temporary employees” who
must be excluded from the unit. Id. at *18–21.
197
Elizabeth A. Harris, Columbia Graduate Students Vote Overwhelmingly to Unionize,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/nyregion/columbiagraduate-students-union-vote.html. Following the election, an NLRB officer dismissed
Columbia’s objections regarding the validity of the elections. Ginger Adams Otis, Graduate
Workers at Columbia Get OK from National Labor Relations Board to Join Union, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Mar. 7, 2017, 1:28 P.M.), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/graduateworkers-columbia-join-union-article-1.2990869.
198
Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Yale Graduate Students Vote to Form a Union, WASH. POST
(Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/02/24/yalegraduate-students-vote-to-form-a-union.
199
Ed Stannard, Yale University Graduate Students in 9 Departments Given Right to Hold
Union Elections, NEW HAVEN REG. (Jan. 25, 2017, 7:33 P.M.), http://www.nhregister.com/
general-news/20170125/yale-university-graduate-students-in-9-departments-given-right-tohold-union-elections.
200
After the initial election at Harvard resulted in a majority of votes against
unionization, the Regional Director ordered a re-vote due to concerns over the adequacy of
eligible voter lists circulated prior to the election. Caroline S. Engelmayer, Harvard Appeals
Unionization Vote Ruling to National NLRB, THE HARVARD CRIMSON (Aug. 15, 2017),
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2017/8/15/harvard-appeals-decision-nlrb/. Harvard has
appealed the decision to the full NLRB. Id.
201
As of this writing, the election at Cornell was too close to call. Meg Gordon, With
New Tactics, Graduate Students Look to Renew Last Year’s Union Effort, THE CORNELL
DAILY SUN (Aug. 22, 2017), http://cornellsun.com/2017/08/22/with-new-tactics-graduatestudents-look-to-renew-last-years-union-effort/. Prior to the vote, the administration actively
campaigned against the union. See Statement of Hunter R. Rawlings III, Interim President,
Cornell University, Interim President Rawlings Issues Statement on Graduate Assistant Labor
Union Representation (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/2016/10/
statement-graduate-assistant-unionization.
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section 2(3) of the NLRA.
In an ideal world, this job would fall to Congress, which could amend
the NLRA to specifically include students in the Act. But, the NLRA has
not been amended since 1974,202 and Congress may be unlikely to break its
streak of inaction. Therefore, the responsibility to craft stable labor
regulations must fall to the NLRB. As previously noted, the Board has two
rulemaking tools—adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemaking.203
This Part discusses the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches to
show why notice-and-comment rulemaking is the only way to eliminate the
present uncertainty concerning the employment status of students and
provide guidance and stability moving forward.
A. Adjudication vs. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
Both adjudication and notice-and-comment rulemaking have their
advantages, but neither is perfectly suited for every situation.204 Yet, this
fundamental fact appears to be lost on the NLRB, which throughout its
history has almost exclusively relied on adjudication to set policy and resolve
disputes.205 Even the Supreme Court, while acknowledging the importance
of maintaining the flexibility afforded by adjudication in many situations,
has opined that the Board should promulgate formal rules where
appropriate.206 Generally speaking, the primary advantages of adjudication
are flexibility and specificity, while the advantages of notice-and-comment
rulemaking are clarity and stability.
1. Advantages of Adjudication
Adjudication by an agency focuses on particular disputes between
particular parties and, as such, is “better suited for intensive exploration of
factual disputes and . . . resol[ution of] narrow policy issues involving
limited numbers of contestants.”207 Similarly, “the party most immediately
affected has substantially greater procedural rights than he would have in
202

Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395.
See discussion supra pp. 200-01.
204
Lubbers, supra note 19, at 415 (citing Richard K. Berg, Re-examining Policy
Procedures: The Choice Between Rulemaking and Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149, 162
(1986)).
205
N.L.R.B. v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 832 F.3d 432, 445 n.13 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)); see generally
Garden, supra note 69, at 1471.
206
See N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (“[T]here may be
situations where the Board’s reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion
or a violation of the Act.”); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (“The function
of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through this
quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future.”).
207
Lubbers, supra note 19, at 415 (quoting Berg, supra note 204, at 162).
203
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rulemaking.”208 Moreover, adjudication allows the “flexibility to adjust
standards as novel situations arise or as the agency gains experience.”209
Adjudication thus forms policy gradually, rather than the all-at-once
approach of a formal rule. This gradual rulemaking may be less likely to
attract unwanted attention from Congress or the Supreme Court.210 As one
commentator noted, “there is far more at stake when a rule is rejected by a
federal court than when an adjudicated decision is reversed.”211 The Board
itself has defended its reliance on adjudication because the “cumbersome
process of amending formal rules would impede the law’s ability to respond
quickly and accurately to changing industrial practices.”212
2. Advantages of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
While adjudication can be an effective mechanism for addressing many
narrow, fact-specific issues, notice-and-comment rulemaking is typically
better suited for addressing broader policy concerns. Rather than waiting for
aggrieved parties to come before an agency, formal rulemaking allows an
agency to decide exactly when and how to address an issue.213 Once an
agency initiates a formal rulemaking proceeding, the comments and
empirical evidence submitted by the public create a more thorough record,
and may lead to better decision-making by the agency.214 Additionally, if an
agency methodically addresses all concerns raised by opponents of the new
rule, courts may be more likely to show deference to the agency’s decision
to adopt the rule.215
Finally, an administrative regulation is binding on all future agency
adjudications, which may make a particular policy significantly more
stable.216 In order for an agency to modify or eliminate a regulation, it would
have to institute another formal rulemaking proceeding.217 As detailed
above, this process is much more cumbersome than simply announcing a rule

208

Id. (quoting Berg, supra note 204, at 162).
Garden, supra note 69, at 1474.
210
See id.
211
James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 221, 235 (2005).
212
Lubbers, supra note 19, at 416 (citing Scott A. Zebrak, Comment, The Future of NLRB
Rulemaking: Analyzing the Mixed Signals Sent by the Implementation of the Health Care
Bargaining Unit Rule and by the Proposed Beck Union Dues Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 125, 129 (1994)).
213
Garden, supra note 69, at 1475.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Lubbers, supra note 19, at 416.
217
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. Local 3090 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 777 F.2d 751,
759 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
209
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through adjudication,218 and policy shifts effected through this formal
mechanism may be more likely to be perceived as legitimate.219
B. Application of Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking to Student
Assistants
The advantages and disadvantages outlined above weigh heavily in
favor of using notice-and-comment rulemaking to settle the threshold
question of whether student assistants are “employees” under the NLRA.
This is not a “novel situation” that requires the Board to retain its flexibility.
It has been litigated and re-litigated for decades, and although the basic facts
surrounding student assistants have remained the same, the determinations
made by the Board have not. The stability and clarity of a formal
administrative regulation is necessary to provide finality and to allow
students and universities to make informed decisions moving forward.
Similarly, a rule in this context would in no way impede the Board’s ability
to “respond quickly and accurately to changing industrial practices.”220
Industrial practices have not changed since New York University; only the
composition of the NLRB has.
Importantly, the comment period in a formal rulemaking proceeding
would give affected persons the opportunity to voice their concerns and
allow the Board to make an informed decision on whether, or how, it should
restrict the collective-bargaining rights of students. Opponents of studentunionization have raised numerous concerns about applying the NLRA to
students,221 most of which would undoubtedly be addressed during the
rulemaking proceeding. However, one particular concern—the importance
of academic freedom—merits particular consideration.
Although not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, it is well settled
that academic freedom in a university is “a special concern of the First
Amendment because of the university’s unique role in participating in and
fostering a marketplace of ideas.”222 Chief Justice Warren best described the
218

See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); see supra pp. 200-01.
Garden, supra note 69, at 1476.
220
Zebrak, supra note 212, at 129.
221
For instance, in his dissent in Columbia University, Member Miscimarra enumerated
an extensive list of “unfortunate consequences” that could stem from the ruling. Trs. of
Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90, at *29–31 (Aug. 23, 2016). These potential issues
include: (1) Schools may withhold, suspend, or delay academic credit if a student-assistant is
unable to work due to a strike or lockout; (2) Certain disclosures mandated by the NLRA may
directly conflict with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA); (3) Schools
may not be able to conduct confidential investigations into allegations of sexual harassment;
and (4) Schools may be restricted from promulgating general rules promoting civility or rules
barring profanity. Id. The merit of these concerns, and of other issues contemplated by the
Columbia University dissent, falls outside the scope of this Comment.
222
Brown v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 824 F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Keyishian v.
219
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importance of maintaining academic freedom in his poignant (if slightly
dramatic) majority opinion in Sweezy v. State of N.H.:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate
the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and
train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future
of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be
made. . . . Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of
suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.223
Based on these compelling policy rationales, courts have identified
“four essential freedoms” afforded to educational institutions: the right to
decide “who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study.”224
Concerns over the effect that collective bargaining may have on
academic freedom could have some merit, but as noted by the Board in
Columbia University, these concerns cannot justify the complete exclusion
of students from the NLRA.225 Instead, the Board should specifically carveout matters that would infringe on a university’s academic freedom. The
statute governing collective bargaining at the University of California
provides an excellent model for this:
(q)(1) For purposes of the University of California only . . . [t]he
scope of representation shall not include any of the following:
. . . (C) Admission requirements for students, conditions for
the award of certificates and degrees to students, and the
content and supervision of courses, curricula, and research
programs.226
Other states have imposed similar restrictions (through statute or
adjudication) on collective bargaining,227 but the California statute provides
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)) (internal quotations omitted).
223
Sweezy v. State of N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
224
Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 172 (3d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)); see also Regents of
Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 n.11 (1985) (quoting Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz,
435 U.S. 78, 96, n.6 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)) (“University faculties must have the
widest range of discretion in making judgments as to the academic performance of students
and their entitlement to promotion or graduation.”).
225
Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B No. 90, at *7.
226
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3562(q)(1)(C) (West 2016).
227
See, e.g., Federated Publ’ns, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 594 N.W. 2d 491, 497 (Mich. 1999)
(citing Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Mich. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 204 N.W. 2d 218
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the requisite specificity to protect the “four essential freedoms” of
educational institutions, while leaving students ample bargaining room.
Undoubtedly, additional issues stemming from the unique position of
colleges and universities will arise with the passage of time. If, during the
notice-and-comment period, the NLRB finds that any other issues merit
significant consideration, it should adjust its new rule accordingly. Most of
these concerns, however, can likely be dealt with on a case-by-case basis and
are properly left to Board’s adjudicatory process. The Board should
therefore exercise its notice-and-comment rulemaking authority to craft a
regulation specifying that student-workers are statutory employees entitled
to full collective-bargaining rights, subject to the academic restrictions
outlined above.
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of NLRB jurisprudence regarding the employment status
of student assistants has been muddled and inconsistent. Now, the Board has
the opportunity to codify its holding in Columbia University and make it
significantly more difficult for future administrations to revive the “primary
purpose” test. By doing so, the Board can provide much needed guidance
and clarity to both students and universities and help alleviate the NLRB’s
reputation for inconsistency. Perhaps someday Congress will step in to
amend the NLRA to provide permanent clarity on this issue, but until then,
the Board should do the next best thing by stepping out of its comfort zone
and crafting a formal administrative rule.

(Mich. 1973)) (“[T]he scope of bargaining . . . may be limited if the subject matter falls clearly
within the educational sphere”).

